Like all our problems, the solution to the problem of whether
a real person begins at the instant that the mother is impregnated or at the
instant that the child is born lies in philosophy. Specifically, it lies in solving the ancient dilemma of uniqueness, which is
ultimately a metaphysical question pertaining to the nature of Reality itself. So let us begin by considering that dilemma,
in the terms of human nature. . . .
We all know through our common logic that we are each
unique as individuals. No one else is
you. So we must ask why our
intellectuals haven’t yet explained what makes us unique. Some ancient Greeks tried to solve the problem
by positing the psyche, which
literally means ‘to breathe’ and which is equivalent to mystical terms such as
‘soul’ or ‘spirit’. They held that we
are each unique because we innately possess this defining essence, which was
perhaps god-given but was in any case unknowable. So for millennia most people assumed that
this imaginary thing, which theists called our ‘soul’, caused our uniqueness,
and that no further explanation was needed.
Astrologers adopted this mystical explanation without objection, and
then came the modern psychologists, who divided into three schools of opinion
on the issue -- the mystics (including the Freudians and Jungians), the negativists (the behaviorists who deny theory), and the positivists -- none of which solved the problem.
. . . Only the positivists offered a solution, but it doesn’t withstand analysis. Since they concluded that there is no single
thing that causes our uniqueness, they had to define it as being the set of all possible attributes of a person. But they failed to see that this is a truism,
since a hypothetical summation of all our attributes must include what makes us
unique, whether it is one thing or more things.
So they never explained our uniqueness, they just presupposed it by mass
inclusion, and then they agreed as academics to use this class conception to
assume a human’s uniqueness, and to refer to it as our personality, a term that is ambiguous, vague, and has many
conflicting senses.
. . . The real solution to this dilemma is so well known to us all inexplicitly through our common logic that I was surprised to find in my readings that no one had ever stated it directly. People are not unique because of, say, the color of their eyes, their race, their gender, or any summation of such shared attributes that one can describe. They are only unique because each person is a distinct event, a motion system within the whole Reality that has a unique position in space, and that is the one attribute that makes anything in the universe unique. For instance, I am not the only person with hazel eyes, but I am the only person here and now with hazel eyes.
Nothing is unique to us until we identify its position in
space. Since no two things can occupy
the same space at the same time, and since I have shown in Chapter 3 that
‘time’ is not a fourth dimension, but is just another way that we measure
space, our space is our defining essence, and it is necessarily unique. We share some spaces with other things, true,
but not our space, which is defined
by the spatial point (formerly called ‘the time’) at which we leave our
mother’s womb, and then by our own zenith and nadir as we move on the earth as
an independent event, or motion system. Every
other attribute of anything in Reality is shared with other things, and no sum of
these relative things can explain our uniqueness, either as a species or as
individuals. . . .
This solution to the dilemma of uniqueness—which can only
be reached through metaphysics—gives us a basic principle of our new science of
human nature, and this is that any thing
is uniquely defined only by its spatial position. From this principle we can clarify several ancient
confusions, such as our notions of destiny,
of forecasting, and of free will, but here I will just show how
it solves the old, but politically urgent, argument of whether life, and hence personhood,
begins at conception or at birth.
Critics of astrology argue that the true beginning of any
event is its conception and not its birth, but this is not so. Since the uniqueness of an event is its
spatial position (formerly its spatial and temporal position), any reference that we make to the formative process that
created it refers to a different spatial event, and it is fallacious to mix two
contexts of reference in an argument. If
we don’t consistently hold that the point of birth is the true beginning and
distinct identity of any creation, be it a new organism in a womb or a new idea
in a mind, then we are either proposing an infinite regression of causes or we
are arbitrarily selecting one event in the entire chain of prior events as its
cause.
This is why one who accepts astrology cannot logically
oppose abortions. Astrologists know that
a distinct, unique person only comes into existence at birth, but
antiabortionists (who to be consistent must also oppose natal astrology) assume
that a distinct person is created solely by an act of conception and nothing
further. This is nonsense, of course,
for much more is needed after that initial event to make a distinct person, and
it is the birth alone that sums up all of those prenatal events that ultimately
produce a real and whole person.
Imagine a case where a fetus acquires a major disease or
defect shortly before its birth. We
clearly can’t conclude that the act of conception caused that defect. No, we must consider all of the prenatal
events that the embryo and fetus experienced during the entire pregnancy. So until the actual birth occurs, we can’t
speak realistically, as opposed to hypothetically, of that being-in-formation
as a real and whole person.
Our metaphysics keeps our thinking straight on this, by telling us that a whole event is defined only by its spatial relativity. Thus, nothing is a distinct event or a real context of reference until it has been born and exists separately. So when you refer to either a notion in your mind or a fetus in your womb (which in this context are equivalents), you are not referring to the future idea or child that might later exist independently. Until an idea or a fetus has been born into its own space and path of motion, it is not a distinct event, or a unique motion system within Reality; it is just an internal part of its carrier’s space and path. Clearly, one cannot logically speak of the birthing process and the later process of a thing’s postnatal life as if they were the same process. They are distinct processes by definition. An event’s conception is always internal to its conceiver, so though we can speak hypothetically of an idea or a fetus as if it had been born, it is not yet a unique external event. Any internal event in our mind or body that has not been externalized has no life of its own. Strictly speaking, then, to study the prenatal development of an organism is not to study life; it is to study the formation of life inside a unique person, or motion system.
Our metaphysics keeps our thinking straight on this, by telling us that a whole event is defined only by its spatial relativity. Thus, nothing is a distinct event or a real context of reference until it has been born and exists separately. So when you refer to either a notion in your mind or a fetus in your womb (which in this context are equivalents), you are not referring to the future idea or child that might later exist independently. Until an idea or a fetus has been born into its own space and path of motion, it is not a distinct event, or a unique motion system within Reality; it is just an internal part of its carrier’s space and path. Clearly, one cannot logically speak of the birthing process and the later process of a thing’s postnatal life as if they were the same process. They are distinct processes by definition. An event’s conception is always internal to its conceiver, so though we can speak hypothetically of an idea or a fetus as if it had been born, it is not yet a unique external event. Any internal event in our mind or body that has not been externalized has no life of its own. Strictly speaking, then, to study the prenatal development of an organism is not to study life; it is to study the formation of life inside a unique person, or motion system.
As for the specious arguments by the conception-is-personhood advocates that a fetus ‘feels’ pain or
pleasure and therefore is ‘alive’ before its birth, this is just wordplay. The fact that a fetus can be stimulated by
events inside or outside the womb and will move in response to those provocations
doesn’t mean that it is ‘feeling’ sensations as we wholly formed organisms
do. By definition, a feeling or
sensation requires consciousness, and yet no one has proven that a fetus has that
essential quality of life. Consciousness
is an awareness of self, and there is no
‘self’ for any thing that does not exist in space independently! Our common sense tells us that we acquire
consciousness and are a unique self only when we are born and not an instant
before.
Accordingly, any social science, including jurisprudence,
must begin its reasoning about a person
from the point of his or her birth in space and independence from the mother’s
space, for otherwise it is not reasoning logically. Until it has a time of birth, no real person,
legal person (corporation), or fictional character can exist.
Hence the US Supreme Court’s confusions in its abortion
decisions. This rightist court, solely
to serve the religions it favors, once again introduced contradictions into our
legal system; this time by clouding the established legal definition of a
person, as recorded by a birth certificate (which this court also did in its
absurd decisions to give corporations, or fictional ‘persons’, the same rights
that real individuals have). So rather
than continuing to grant legal protection against murder only to a real person,
it granted it to a nonperson, to a thing being formed.
This decision was also wrong because, like all religions
in history, it subordinates women to men, who have no such issue, and it
intrudes on a female’s natural right to control her future life, her private
space, and her internal processes.
Moreover, we cannot equate a woman’s choice to terminate her fetus to
the murder of a living person, for these are totally different acts.
As even the father must recognize, a woman's womb is not a public matter, no more so that is her mind. A just state must have an overriding social justification for denying our natural rights as individuals, which include the sanctity of our mind, body, or womb. In the case of a womb, this justification does exist in our insanely overpopulated world, but for preventing births, not for requiring them. The Supreme Court claimed that the state has a legitimate interest in regulating abortions to protect women's health and "prenatal life," but this term is self-contradictory because it assumes that the word 'life' can mean something that was never born. It is true that the state has a duty to protect it's people's health, but a fetus is not yet a person, and that's the issue here. In fact, this claim makes the state responsible for protecting the health of every woman who elects to abort her fetus. But this duty does not give the state the right to oppose what real persons want for themselves or their inner processes, and especially not by discriminating against half of them. To grant our state that right in even one case is to concede its universal right to control the minds, beliefs, and bodies of all of us, and that is a terrifying precedent--though sadly one that has long been considered acceptable by our rightists, or collectivists.
As even the father must recognize, a woman's womb is not a public matter, no more so that is her mind. A just state must have an overriding social justification for denying our natural rights as individuals, which include the sanctity of our mind, body, or womb. In the case of a womb, this justification does exist in our insanely overpopulated world, but for preventing births, not for requiring them. The Supreme Court claimed that the state has a legitimate interest in regulating abortions to protect women's health and "prenatal life," but this term is self-contradictory because it assumes that the word 'life' can mean something that was never born. It is true that the state has a duty to protect it's people's health, but a fetus is not yet a person, and that's the issue here. In fact, this claim makes the state responsible for protecting the health of every woman who elects to abort her fetus. But this duty does not give the state the right to oppose what real persons want for themselves or their inner processes, and especially not by discriminating against half of them. To grant our state that right in even one case is to concede its universal right to control the minds, beliefs, and bodies of all of us, and that is a terrifying precedent--though sadly one that has long been considered acceptable by our rightists, or collectivists.